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CASENOTE

Garner v. Jones: Restricting Prisoners' Ex'
Post Facto Challenges to Changes in Parole
Systems*

In Garner v. Jones,' the United States Supreme Court laid out rules
for lower courts to determine whether granting parole boards the
discretion to change retroactively the frequency of parole reconsideration
hearings would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court held that
a prisoner challenging one of these statutes must produce certain
evidence that the statute "created a significant risk of increasing his
punishment."2
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In July 1974, Robert L. Jones was convicted of murder and sentenced
to life in prison in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia.3 At
the time of Jones' first conviction, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

*. I wish to extend my gratitude to Elizabeth Kertscher for her helpful suggestions in
preparing this Note.
1. 120 S. Ct. 1362 (2000).
2. Id. at 1370.
3. Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 589-90 (11th Cir. 1999).
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("O.C.G.A.") section 42-9-45(b)4 provided that the State Board of
Pardons ("Board") must consider those serving life sentences for initial
parole consideration after seven years.' Under Georgia Rules &
Regulations, Rule 475-3-.05(2), subsequent reconsideration hearings were
to take place every three years.'
However, five years after being sentenced to life in prison and prior to
Jones' initial parole consideration hearing, Jones escaped from prison.
While a fugitive, Jones committed a second murder. After he was
recaptured in 1982, Jones was sentenced to a second life term. Before
his initial parole consideration hearing, the Board amended Rule 475-3.05(2) and applied the amendment retroactively.' Parole boards were
granted the discretion to increase the time to eight years between
subsequent parole reconsideration hearings for those denied initial
consideration and serving life sentences?
Jones was first considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his
1982 conviction. At that time, Jones was denied parole and his
subsequent parole reconsideration hearing was set, under the 1985
However, the Board
amendment, for eight years later in 1997.10
subsequently amended its rules again in response to the 1991 decision
of Akins v. Snow" by the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit held
that the retroactive application of the Georgia Rules changing the time
between reconsideration hearings violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the United States Constitution. 12 Jones' reconsideration hearings were
again set for three-year intervals, in 1992 and in 1995."3 The Board

4. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45(b) (1997). The statute provides in pertinent part: "Except as
otherwise provided in Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7, inmates serving sentences
aggregating 21 years or more shall become eligible for consideration for parole upon
completion of the service of seven years."
5. 120 S. Ct. at 1365-66 (citing O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45(b) (1982)).
6. Id. at 1366 (citing GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 475-3-.05(2) (1979)).
7. Id.

8. The amended rule provides: "Reconsideration of those inmates serving life
sentences who have been denied parole shall take place at least every eight years. The
Board will inform inmates denied parole of the reasons for such denial without disclosing
confidential sources of information or possible discouraging diagnostic opinions." GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. r. 475-3-.05(2) (1985).
9. 120 S. Ct. at 1366 (citing GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 475-3-.05(2) (1985)). The Board's
policy statement provides that the purpose behind the amendment was to "establish the
maximum possible interval between parole denials and reconsideration in a Life Sentence
Case." Brief for Respondent at 26 n.19. Garner, 120 S. Ct. 1362 (No. 99-137).
10. Id. at 1366.
11. 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991).
12. Id. at 1565.
13. 120 S. Ct. at 1366.
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denied parole each time, citing the "multiple offenses" and "circumstances and nature of the second offense."14 But, in 1995 the Board read the
subsequent decision of California Department of Corrections v. Mo-6
rales15 from the United States Supreme Court to overrule Akins.1
After Jones' 1995 review and denial, the Board scheduled Jones' next
parole reconsideration hearing in conformity with its amended rules for
eight years later, in 2003.'
Jones brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 198318 in the Northern
District of Georgia alleging that the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2)
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 9
He sought a motion for leave to discover evidence for his claim. Citing
Morales, the district court granted the petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Jones' claim.' ° Because the amended Rules
created "only the most speculative and attenuated possibility" of
increasing a prisoner's punishment, the court held that there was no ex
post facto violation.'
However, on appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed and distinguished
Morales." The court of appeals stated that determining whether
retroactive application of the Georgia rules violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause must focus on the effect on the "prisoner's ultimate date of
release."" In Morales the Court relied on several factors that the
Supreme Court believed safeguarded against producing a "sufficient risk
of increasing the measure of punishment attached to covered crimes."24
However, those safeguards were absent from the present case. Unlike
in Morales, the Georgia law applies to "all those inmates serving life
sentences," does not require a particularized finding of fact as to the
reasons for denial, increases the time between parole reconsideration
from one to eight years, and grants too much discretion for board
review." The court also noted that while the purpose behind a statute

14. Id. (citing Akins, 922 F.2d at 1565).
15. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
16. 120 S. Ct. at 1366.
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
19. As is typical in the Georgia parole system, Jones was denied the right to appointed
counsel. He therefore argued his case pro se before the district court. Telephone Interview
with Elizabeth T. Kertscher, Counsel for Respondent at United States Supreme Court (Dec.
5, 2000).
20. 120 S. Ct. at 1366.
21. Id. (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 509).
22. Jones, 164 F.3d at 593-96.
23. Id. at 593 iquoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 513).
24. Id. (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 509).
25. Id. at 593-96.
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would never "be a sufficient basis for concluding that a law violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause," a change for the purpose of increasing a
prisoner's punishment could support that conclusion. 26 Furthermore,
the Policy Statement of the Board allowing inmates to request an
expedited review is insufficient to mitigate the effect on the inmate's
punishment because those statements do not carry the weight of law and
enforcement is left entirely to the discretion of the Board.27 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that states are
not required to adopt the exact procedures in Morales to satisfy the Ex
Post Facto Clause.2 8
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of holding ex post facto criminal laws void originated
several centuries prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution
and is deeply rooted in our legal history. During the debate over the
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton wrote that "the prohibition of ex post
facto laws ...

are perhaps the great[est] securities to liberty and

republicanism than any [the Constitution] contains . "29 As applied to
the states, the Ex Post Facto Clause states, "No State shall ... pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts ....

,,

Calder v. Bull3 is the primary case interpreting the meaning and
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Chase believed that the
purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause was to prevent abuses by the
legislature by giving advance notice to citizens of what actions constitute
a crime. 2 Chase stated that those laws that are ex post facto laws fall
within four categories:

26. Id.
27. Id. at 595. The relevant language of the Policy Statement provides:

It is the policy of the Board that all Life Sentence Cases denied parole may be set
for reconsideration up to a maximum of eight years from the date of the last
denial when, in the Board's determination, it is not reasonable to expect that

parole would be granted during the intervening years. Inmates set-off under this
policy may receive expedited parole reviews in the event of a change in their
circumstances or where the Board receives new information that would warrant
a sooner review.
State Board of Pardons and Paroles Policy Statement No. 4.110 §§ 1.105-06 (1996).
28. Garner, 120 S. Ct. at 1368.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
31. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
32. Id. at 388-89.
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1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offence, [sic] in order to
convict the offender.33

Because the ex post facto doctrine is one of the "vital principles in our
would be
free Republican governments," any act contrary to the 3doctrine
4
considered an invalid exercise of legislative authority.
In In re Medley,3 5 the Supreme Court reiterated its interpretation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause to include those laws that are retrospective
3
and "which [alter] the situation of the accused to his disadvantage." 1
Petitioner challenged the retroactive application of a statute that
required those being held for capital crimes to be held in solitary
confinement. The former law, in effect at the time petitioner committed
the crime, contained no requirement of this sort.37 The Court held that,
because the new statute imposed "additional punishment of the most
important and painful character," the act was void under the United
States Constitution.38
Beazell v. Ohio39 demonstrates the Court's twentieth-century
approach to the Ex Post Facto Clause and assesses the degree to which
a retrospective application of a law disadvantages the offender.4"
Beazell involved an Ohio statute that made discretionary the granting
of separate trials for those jointly indicted of felonies, amending an
earlier statute that required felons to be tried separately.4' The Court
denied defendant's ex post facto challenge. 42 The Court explained that
determining whether a procedural change violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause requires an analysis of the degree to which the person was
disadvantaged and cannot be established in a definitive set of rules or

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 390.
Id. at 388.
134 U.S. 160 (1890).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170-72.
Id. at 171.
269 U.S. 167 (1925).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 169.
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propositions.4 3 Statutory changes that affect a method of trial or
deprive an accused of a defense "in a limited or unsubstantial manner
to his disadvantage, are not prohibited.""
This analysis became the basis for the Court's decision in Lindsey v.
Washington,4" in which the Court had to determine whether the Ex
Post Facto Clause applied to a retroactive application of a statute that
removed the possibility of a shorter sentence and made the possibility of
parole revocable at will.46 The Court held that this sort of statute was
ex post facto because it increased the possibility of a penalty by
lengthening the required sentence.47 "The Constitution forbids the
application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer."4"
Because the petitioners were denied an opportunity to gain their freedom
from custody under the shorter term mandated at the time they
committed the crime, the new statute was to their "substantial
disadvantage."4 9
The Supreme Court would later rely on several lower court opinions
utilizing this method of analysis in determining the constitutionality of
various changes in parole procedures. In Greenfield v. Scafati,s° a
United States district court held that the retroactive application of a
statute that forfeited good conduct deductions for those who violated
parole conditions to those already under sentence was to the disadvantage of the accused and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.5 The court
recognized that statutory reductions in the amount of good conduct
allowances after incarceration could be invalidated because they
deprived the prisoner of time off he deserved.5 2 The availability of good
conduct time is considered an essential element of the crime. 3
Furthermore, the fact that parole is discretionary does not mean that
depriving a prisoner of parole could never be found ex post facto. The
court concluded that entirely depriving the prisoner of both the right to
earn good conduct time and the right to qualify for parole, even for a
brief period, "materially 'alters the situation of the accused to his

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
301 U.S. 397 (1937).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 401.
Id.
277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967).
Id. at 646.
Id. at 645.
Id.
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disadvantage."'54 Thus, the legislation, enacted and applied after the
offense, was unconstitutional.
Likewise, in Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission,55 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
retroactive elimination "of all opportunity to be released on parole also
comes within the scope of [the Ex Post Facto Clause]." 5 6 The court first
acknowledged that prior case law has not required a technical increase
in punishment.57 However, the Constitution forbids any legislation
that operates to the "substantial disadvantage" of the prisoners.5 8 If a
court finds that parole is an essential element of the punishment for
which a prisoner is convicted, the retroactive elimination of the
prisoner's opportunity to be released on parole is "plainly to his
substantial disadvantage."5 9
Two years later, in Weaver v. Graham, ° the Supreme Court held that
the retroactive application of a statute reducing the amount of gain time
available for good conduct was unconstitutional as an ex post facto
law. 1 Justice Marshall first rejected the argument that a law must
"impair a 'vested right' to violate the ex post facto prohibition."62 For
a law to be declared ex post facto, two elements must be satisfied. First,
the law must be retrospective by having the "effect" of altering the
consequences of acts completed prior to the law's effective date.63 Gain
time can be a decisive factor in determining an offender's prison term
even though it may alter punitive conditions external to the sentence.6 4
Therefore, removal of gain time after the commission of a crime is
retrospective because it "substantially alters the consequences attached
completed, and therefore changes 'the quantum of
to a crime already
65
punishment.'"

54. Id. at 646 (quoting Medley, 134 U.S. at 171).
55. 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 175. For a more general discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
federal parole system, see Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, United States Parole
Commission Guidedlinesfor Federal Prisoners,61 A.L.R. FED. 135, 155-59 (1983).
57. 594 F.2d at 174.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 175.
60. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
61. Id. at 35-36; see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431 (1987), in which the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that revised sentencing guidelines survived attack
because they provided notice that the laws "might be changed." Id. at 431.
62. 450 U.S. at 29.
63. Id. at 29-30.
64. Id. at 31-32.
65. Id. at 32-33 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977)).
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Second, a retrospective law will be held unconstitutional only if the
statute disadvantages the offender.6 A statute does not need to
increase the punishment attached to a crime to be disadvantageous but
can simply lengthen the term that a prisoner must spend in prison or
reduce an opportunity to shorten his time in prison.6 7 Marshall
explained that courts should look to the statute itself and not to any
provisions that "mitigate its effect on the particular individual."" A
statute that reduces the opportunity to earn early release through gain
time solely for good conduct increases the amount of time a prisoner
must spend in prison and "makes more onerous the punishment for
crimes committed before its enactment."6 9 Curiously absent from
Marshall's language was the phrase "substantial
disadvantage," replaced
70
only with "to [the prisoner's] disadvantage."
This rationale was extended in Akins v. Snow,7 ' in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit thoroughly addressed
the issue of whether the retroactive reduction in the frequency of parole
reconsideration hearings violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court
addressed what it saw as "three preliminary issues" prior to its analysis
of the ex post facto challenge.73 First, the court determined that Board
rules have the "force and effect of law" because the legislature delegated
the authority to the Board to enact rules.74 Second, because an inmate
is not eligible for parole without a parole hearing, parole hearings are
"an essential part of parole eligibility."75 After being denied parole at
his initial parole consideration, a prisoner must receive a reconsideration
before parole can be granted.v6 Finally, the court found that parole
eligibility is part of a prisoner's sentence.7 7 The court then applied the
Weaver two-prong analysis to determine if the Board rules violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause."8 First, the court determined that the law was
retrospective. 7' By changing the frequency of parole reconsideration

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 34 (citing Medley, 134 U.S. at 171).
922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1563-64.
Id. at 1561.
Id.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1561-62.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1563-64.
Id. at 1564.
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hearings after prisoners commit crimes, the "Board effectively altered
the consequences of their crimes after they were completed." 0 Second,
the court held the law "substantially disadvantage[d]" the prisoners'
parole eligibility.8 Relying on its holding that a parole reconsideration
hearing is an essential part of parole eligibility, the court stated that
alterations in the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings also alter
a prisoner's parole eligibility.8 2 Because this alteration results in an
increase in the amount of time a prisoner must spend in prison before
becoming eligible for parole, the change "substantially disadvantages a
prisoner." 3
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 4 the Supreme
Court held that determining whether a California statute that decreased
the frequency of reconsideration hearings violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause turned on whether the specific changes created "a sufficient risk
of increasing the measure of punishment attached to covered crimes."8 5
Defendant, who was convicted of multiple murders, claimed changes of
this sort violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they stiffen the
punishment attached to the crime by creating the possibility of affecting
a prisoner's punishment.8" Justice Thomas rejected this argument,
stating the Court's ex post facto analysis has never been set in a single
formula but has been determined by the "degree" to which the legislative
adjustments affect the prisoner.8 7
In deciding whether the California statute increased the punishment
for a crime after its commission, Justice Thomas noted several factors.8 8
The scope of the statute was limited to "a class of prisoners for whom the
likelihood of release on parole is quite remote." 9 Furthermore, the
statute is replete with safeguards ensuring that its application does not
result in extending an inmate's sentence.9" First, the statute was
"carefully tailored" to the end of saving time and money by not requiring

80. Id.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83. Id.
84. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
85. Id. at 509. For a more general analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause and
punishment, see Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudenceof
Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (1998); see also JOSEPH G. COOK, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 1:20 (3d ed. 1996).
86. 514 U.S. at 508.
87. Id. at 509 (citing Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171).
88. Id. at 510-13.
89. Id. at 510.
90. Id. at 510-11.
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the parole board to conduct hearings for an inmate it believed had no
chance of release. 9 Second, the parole board was required to conduct
"'a full hearing and review' of all the relevant facts," stating a reason for
its finding.92 Third, the statute allowed the parole board to tailor the
frequency of subsequent hearings based on the "particular circumstances
of the individual prisoner."9" Fourth, the Court found that a "prisoner's
ultimate date of release would be entirely unaffected by the change in
the timing of suitability hearings.""' Finally, the California Board of
Prison Terms could expedite a release date if it felt that the facts of any
case warranted such an early release.95 Courts should not be subjected
to reviewing countless minor legislative adjustments in parole and
sentencing guidelines that have only the mere possibility of impacting
a prisoner's term of confinement.96 Justice Thomas believed the totality
of the changes created "only the most speculative and attenuated risk of
increasing the measure of punishment attached to covered crime" and
were, therefore, not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.97
The dissent, consisting of Justices Stevens and Souter, described the
majority's description of the respondent's claim of increased punishment
as "speculative" to be "not only unpersuasive, but actually perverse."9"
Justice Stevens believed prior case law made clear that any retroactive
application of a law that decreases the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings would eliminate a prisoner's chance to earn release.99
Completely eliminating the chance to earn release when it existed
previously would be an an increase in punishment and would violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause.'0 0 The majority's reliance on the fact that the
statute affected only one class of persons is the danger the Ex Post Facto
Clause was enacted to prevent: "[administering] justice unfairly against
particular individuals."'0 ' Furthermore, the provision, which requires
the parole board to make particular findings of fact prior to denial, fails
to satisfy the Ex Post Facto Clause.0 2 Justice Stevens stated that the

91. Id.
92. Id. at 511 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 513.
95. Id. at 512-13.

96. Id. at 508-09.
97. Id. at 514.
98. Id. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

99. Id. at 516-17.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 516.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 522-23.
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statute provides no means to review
Board decisions of erroneous
10 3
decisions or change in circumstances.
Two years later, in Lynce v. Mathis °4 a unanimous Supreme Court
applied the Morales standards and held that retroactive cancellation of
accumulated overcrowding credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.' 5
Petitioner had been released from prison based on accumulated
overcrowding credits but was subsequently rearrested after all the
credits were retroactively canceled for those convicted of murder.' 6
Justice Stevens explained that, because the statute was clearly
retrospective as applied to petitioner, the key determination was
whether the statute was to his disadvantage."' Justice Stevens stated
that the Court in Weaver and Morales had not focused on the legislative
purpose behind the statute but on whether the effect of the statute was
to lengthen the petitioner's period of incarceration.0 8 The decision in
Morales, which only removed a mechanism creating an opportunity for
early release, had only a speculative effect on prisoners.' 9 However,
in Lynce the Court stated there is no need to speculate about the effect
of the legislative adjustment when the petitioner had been rearrested:
"The 1992 statute has unquestionably disadvantaged petitioner because
it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged imprisonment."" 0
Garner v. Jones"' was the next case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the application of the ex post facto doctrine to alterations in
subsequent parole reconsideration hearings. In GarnerJustice Kennedy
distinguished
the Georgia statute from those factors present in
2
Morales."
III.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

In Garner the Supreme Court laid out several rules for lower courts
to determine whether the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated by statutes
which grant parole boards the discretion to decrease the frequency of
reconsideration hearings after the commission of a crime. 113 Justice
Kennedy stated the court of appeals erred by not properly determining

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 523.
519 U.S. 433 (1997).
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 444.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).
111. 120 S. Ct. 1362.
112. Id. at 1366-68.

113. Id.
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whether the amended rules "created a significant risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes." 14
The first inquiry is whether a rule, on its face, creates a "sufficient
risk of prolonging respondent's incarceration."'15 Justice Kennedy
noted that states were not required to replicate the exact procedures
adopted by California in Morales to satisfy the Ex Post Facto
Clause." 6 States must have adequate flexibility in dealing with issues
involving confinement and release. 117 Consistent with this notion,
granting parole boards discretion can actually allow an amendment to
a rule setting the frequency of reconsideration hearings to satisfy the Ex
Post Facto Clause."' While changing a punishment after the commission of the crime is the evil that the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to
prevent, the change inherent in a parole board's discretion allows the
board to make decisions based on prior experience and gives the board
the ability to adapt to new situations." 9 Courts should presume,
absent any clear evidence, that parole boards will exercise their
discretion to grant early review. 2 °
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy stated that the Georgia law decreasing
the frequency of parole reviews was qualified for two additional
reasons.12' First, despite the parole board's discretion to grant reviews
based on changes in circumstances, parole boards were required by law
122
to set reconsideration hearings at a maximum of eight years.
Second, Georgia Parole Board rules permitted additional "reviews in the
event of a change in [prisoner's] circumstance or where the Board
123
receives new information that would warrant a sooner review."
These qualifications ensure a more accurate exercise of the parole
boards' discretion. 124 Not only can a board set reconsideration hearings based on the likelihood of release, but boards can also focus their
resources on those prisoners identified as having a better possibility of
release.' 25

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1367 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 509).
1368 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 509).
1367.
1368.
1367-68.
1369.
1370-71.
1369.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1370.

GARNER V. JONES

2001]

773

If a prisoner is unable to show a "significant risk" of increased
incarceration based on the terms of the statute, then the prisoner must
show "that as applied to his own sentence the law created a significant
risk of increasing his punishment."126 To challenge an amendment, a
prisoner is allowed to present evidence demonstrating that the application of the amended rule "increases, to a sufficient degree," the
probability of prolonging his incarceration.'27 Justice Kennedy instructed courts to consider "the general operation of the [state's] parole
system.""2 Evidence in support of the statute could come from how a
parole board exercises its discretion, including the parole board's
internal policy statements or its actual practices. 29 In the present
case, the Georgia statute had the additional safeguard of allowing
prisoners the right to petition the Board for expedited consideration
based on a change in circumstances.' 3° Furthermore, courts are to
presume that parole boards will exercise their discretion to grant
additional reviews based on the assessment of the likelihood of each
inmate's release. 3 ' Because the court of appeals analysis "failed to
reveal whether the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2), in its operation,
punishment," the Court remanded
created a significant risk of increased
32
the case for this consideration. 1
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia admonished the majority for
remanding the case, noting that the Ex Post Facto Clause concerns
"increases in punishment" not "decreasing the likelihood of parole."'33
Scalia emphasized that the decision in Morales, which also found a
state's statute changing the frequency of parole reconsideration did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, applied to cases when the parole board
was granted discretion to decrease the frequency of reconsideration
hearings.' 34 But in Garner the Georgia Parole Board had always been
entrusted with the discretion to decide the ultimate period between
reconsideration hearings and the ultimate decision of parole.3 5
Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that parole itself was a matter of
"mercy or clemency," in no way affecting the ultimate punishment a

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.

133. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135.

Id.
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prisoner could receive when he committed a crime. 136 "[A]ny risk
engendered by changes to the length of that period is merely part of the
uncertainty which was inherent in the discretionary parole system, and
to which respondent subjected himself when he committed his
crime. " 137 Contrary to the majority opinion, there was no need to
remand the case to review the Board's policy statements because the
statements in no way created a "reasonable expectation of entitlement"
giving rise to an ex post facto concern. 3 '
In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, Justice Souter
criticized the majority for failing to recognize the "risk that the class
affected by the change will serve a longer sentence as a result."139 The
dissent first demonstrated what it saw as an increase in the punishment
of prisoners under the Georgia rule by comparing the average terms
served under the new and old rules. 4 ° Justice Souter also warned
that the majority's decision was contrary to the Court's opinion in
Morales.141 While the California law in Morales impacted only those
shown to have a minimal chance for release, the Georgia amended rules
had the possibility of increasing the "punishment for all life-sentenced
prisoners. " 142 Furthermore, the lower courts' refusal to allow for
discovery severely limited defendant's ability to prove a "substantial risk
of longer sentences." 3 Justice Souter also believed that there was
inadequate evidence to show that the parole board's discretion to reexamine a prisoner's case in any " 1way
mitigated the "substantial
44
probability of increased punishment.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Garner represents a dramatic shift from the Supreme Court's ex post
facto jurisprudence as applied to parole systems. The Court has changed
its recent holding in both Morales and Lynce that the standard for
challenging retroactive changes in the parole systems is whether the
amended rule "produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of
punishment attached to covered crimes."' 4 Instead, the Court now

136. Id.
137. Id. at 1372.
138. Id.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
145. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509; Lynce, 519 U.S. at 444.
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requires that prisoners challenging retroactive changes in parole systems
show that the amended rule, "in its operation, created a significant risk
of increased punishment" for the inmate.14
As with all issues relating to prison systems, the Court must balance
the interests of parole boards and prison systems with the constitutional
rights of prison inmates. In Garner the Court stated that the "States
must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedures and
addressing problems associated with confinement and release." 7
However, at what point can it be said that changes in parole systems
have gone too far? Furthermore, it is unclear what changes to a parole
system will meet the "significant risk of increasing ... punishment" test.
If the Supreme Court has upheld changing the interval from one to three
years, and three to eight years, would it be going too far to change the
interval from eight to twenty, thirty, or fifty years?
The Court's decision also leaves open the question of what evidence an
inmate could produce to satisfy the "significant risk of increasing...
punishment" standard. Under the Morales standard, a prisoner could
produce statistics demonstrating the system-wide effect on the average
length of those serving life sentences. 148 But Garner narrows the
already thin line of evidence available to bring ex post facto challenges
to changes in parole systems. This effect could not be any more
apparent than when the new standard is applied to the Georgia parole
system. Under the Georgia system, an inmate does not have an inperson hearing before the Board. Instead, a "parole officer" conducts an
investigation detailing the arrest records, court records, and current and
prior offenses.' 49 As the Board notes, "the overriding factor in determining whether or not to parole a person under life sentence is the
severity of the crime." 5 ' When a decision is reached, neither Georgia
law, Georgia rules, nor the Board's policy statement requires the Board
to give a detailed factual reasoning for its decision. Furthermore, if an
inmate is denied parole, the inmate is not permitted to review any
information within the Board's file as its contents are considered
"confidential state secrets" under Georgia law.'51

146.

Garner, 120 S. Ct. at 1371.

147.

Id. at 1368.

148.
149.
7, 2000)
150.
151.
1979).

Id. at 1370.
See State of Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, ParoleDecisions (visited Dec.
<http'//www.pap.state.ga.us/decisions.htm>.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-53(b) (1997); see also Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir.
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The Georgia system seems to suggest that an inmate's success in
bringing an ex post facto challenge could be entirely determined by what
information a parole board or state legislature wished to grant the
inmate. Given the inmate's limited access to information and lack of a
detailed explanation for denial, one must wonder how Georgia inmates,
who do not have the right to appointed counsel in the parole process,
could produce sufficient evidence of "a significant risk of increasing...
punishment." Furthermore, if a Board member's term is limited to seven
years under the Georgia Constitution,'52 how would an inmate know
what new Board members would be looking for eight years later?'5 3
What also remains uncertain is whether other prison systems will
view the Garner decision as a license to make additional retroactive
changes in parole systems, further expanding a parole board's discre' The danger inherent in the Garner decision is that it may be
tion. "54
read as the United States Supreme Court's willingness to limit severely
an unpopular group's ability to bring ex post facto challenges to any
changes in a highly political and disfavored arena. Prison systems must
remember that "it is well and good for any state to wage a war on crime,
Constitution commands that, in such a war, the State must fight
but our
" 155
fair.
ROBERT A. RENJEL

152. See GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 1 1 (1983).
153. On September 26, 2000, Elizabeth Kertscher, counsel for the Respondent, filed a
Suggestion of Death under Rule 25 to inform the court that Robert L. Jones passed away
on Tuesday, September 5, 2000. Telephone interview with Elizabeth Kertscher, Counsel
for Respondent at the United States Supreme Court (Dec. 5, 2000). However, two Georgia
state prisoners, Timothy W. Kramer and Jerome T. Pattillo, subsequently filed Motions to
Intervene as Plaintiffs, each believing that the dismissal of the case would "impair and/or
impeade [sic] his ability to protect his interest." Applicant's Claim Supporting Intervention

16.
154. Several appellate courts stayed their decisions anticipating the decision in Garner.
See Harris v. Hammonds, 217 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Ray v. Jacobs, 272 Ga. 760, 534
S.E.2d 418 (2000); Jernigan v. South Carolina, 531 S.E.2d 507 (S.C. 2000).
155. Brief for Respondent at 37, Garner, 120 S. Ct. 1362 (No. 99-137).

